Skip to main content

DMVPN - phase two - EIGRP

The phase two allows me on spoke-to-spoke communication. Please read my previous post (EIGRP phase one): http://myitmicroblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/dmvpn-phase-one-eigrp.html
dmvpn-1-1.jpg

You should know the phase two is not recommended because the phase three solves many issues like scalability. I will describe the differences between them in my next post.

From the configuration perspective I need to change:

R1 (hub):
 
interface Tunnel0
  no ip next-hop-self eigrp 1

Let’s check the settings on R2 before we send traffic:
 
R2#sh ip route eigrp
     33.0.0.0/24 is subnetted, 1 subnets
D       33.33.33.0 [90/310172416] via 10.10.10.3, 00:22:35, Tunnel0
D    11.0.0.0/8 [90/297372416] via 10.10.10.1, 00:22:37, Tunnel0
R2#

As you see the next hop for Lan3 (33.33.33.33) is R3 not R1 like with the phase one.
 
R2#sh ip nhrp
10.10.10.1/32 via 10.10.10.1, Tunnel0 created 01:40:18, never expire
  Type: static, Flags: nat used
  NBMA address: 5.5.5.1
R2#
 
R2#sh ip cef | i 33
33.33.33.0/24       10.10.10.3           Tunnel0
R2#
R2#sh dmvpn
Legend: Attrb --> S - Static, D - Dynamic, I - Incompletea
        N - NATed, L - Local, X - No Socket
        # Ent --> Number of NHRP entries with same NBMA peer

Tunnel0, Type:Spoke, NHRP Peers:1,
 # Ent  Peer NBMA Addr Peer Tunnel Add State  UpDn Tm Attrb
 ----- --------------- --------------- ----- -------- -----
     1         5.5.5.1      10.10.10.1    UP 01:43:00 S

R2#
 
R2#sh dmvpn detail
Legend: Attrb --> S - Static, D - Dynamic, I - Incompletea
        N - NATed, L - Local, X - No Socket
        # Ent --> Number of NHRP entries with same NBMA peer

 -------------- Interface Tunnel0 info: --------------
Intf. is up, Line Protocol is up, Addr. is 10.10.10.2
   Source addr: 6.6.6.1, Dest addr: MGRE
  Protocol/Transport: "multi-GRE/IP", Protect "IPSEC-PRF",
Tunnel VRF "", ip vrf forwarding ""

NHRP Details: NHS:         10.10.10.1 RE

Type:Spoke, NBMA Peers:1
# Ent  Peer NBMA Addr Peer Tunnel Add State  UpDn Tm Attrb    Target Network
----- --------------- --------------- ----- -------- ----- -----------------
    1         5.5.5.1      10.10.10.1    UP 01:43:05 S         10.10.10.1/32

  IKE SA: local 6.6.6.1/500 remote 5.5.5.1/500 Active
  Crypto Session Status: UP-ACTIVE
  fvrf: (none)
  IPSEC FLOW: permit 47 host 6.6.6.1 host 5.5.5.1
        Active SAs: 2, origin: crypto map
   Outbound SPI : 0x20F7240B, transform : esp-3des esp-sha-hmac
    Socket State: Open

Pending DMVPN Sessions:

R2#

Now I send traffic from 22.22.22.22 to 33.33.33.33:
 
R2#traceroute 33.33.33.33 source 22.22.22.22

Type escape sequence to abort.
Tracing the route to 33.33.33.33

  1 10.10.10.1 92 msec 64 msec 84 msec
  2 10.10.10.3 116 msec 128 msec 124 msec
R2#
R2#
R2#
R2#traceroute 33.33.33.33 source 22.22.22.22

Type escape sequence to abort.
Tracing the route to 33.33.33.33

  1 10.10.10.3 40 msec 64 msec 88 msec
R2#

So, the traffic initiated building a new NHRP entry:
 
R2#sh ip nhrp
10.10.10.1/32 via 10.10.10.1, Tunnel0 created 01:44:33, never expire
  Type: static, Flags: nat used
  NBMA address: 5.5.5.1
10.10.10.3/32 via 10.10.10.3, Tunnel0 created 00:00:19, expire 01:59:39
  Type: dynamic, Flags: router nat
  NBMA address: 7.7.7.1
R2#

and a new dynamic tunnel:
 
R2#sh dmvpn detail
Legend: Attrb --> S - Static, D - Dynamic, I - Incompletea
        N - NATed, L - Local, X - No Socket
        # Ent --> Number of NHRP entries with same NBMA peer

 -------------- Interface Tunnel0 info: --------------
Intf. is up, Line Protocol is up, Addr. is 10.10.10.2
   Source addr: 6.6.6.1, Dest addr: MGRE
  Protocol/Transport: "multi-GRE/IP", Protect "IPSEC-PRF",
Tunnel VRF "", ip vrf forwarding ""

NHRP Details: NHS:         10.10.10.1 RE

Type:Spoke, NBMA Peers:2
# Ent  Peer NBMA Addr Peer Tunnel Add State  UpDn Tm Attrb    Target Network
----- --------------- --------------- ----- -------- ----- -----------------
    1         5.5.5.1      10.10.10.1    UP 01:45:51 S         10.10.10.1/32

  IKE SA: local 6.6.6.1/500 remote 5.5.5.1/500 Active
  Crypto Session Status: UP-ACTIVE
  fvrf: (none)
  IPSEC FLOW: permit 47 host 6.6.6.1 host 5.5.5.1
        Active SAs: 2, origin: crypto map
   Outbound SPI : 0x20F7240B, transform : esp-3des esp-sha-hmac
    Socket State: Open
# Ent  Peer NBMA Addr Peer Tunnel Add State  UpDn Tm Attrb    Target Network
----- --------------- --------------- ----- -------- ----- -----------------
    1         7.7.7.1      10.10.10.3    UP 00:01:40 D         10.10.10.3/32

  IKE SA: local 6.6.6.1/500 remote 7.7.7.1/500 Active
  Crypto Session Status: UP-ACTIVE
  fvrf: (none)
  IPSEC FLOW: permit 47 host 6.6.6.1 host 7.7.7.1
        Active SAs: 2, origin: crypto map
   Outbound SPI : 0xF6648969, transform : esp-3des esp-sha-hmac
    Socket State: Open

Pending DMVPN Sessions:

R2#

As you see I can build spoke-to-spoke tunnels but you should remember following limitations:
  • you can’t summarize so all spokes need to keep in their routing tables all spokes (phase three fixes this issue)
  • you can’t have different routing protocol on hub-spoke and spoke-spoke routers (phase three resolve the issue)
In my next hop I will test the phase three.

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

What should you know about HA 'override enabled' setting on Fortigate?

High availability is mandatory in most of today's network designs. Only very small companies or branches can run their business without redundancy. When you have Fortigate firewall in your network you have many options to increase network availability. You can use Fortigate Clustering Protocol ( FGCP ) or Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol ( VRRP ). FGCP has two modes: 'override' disabled (default) and 'override' enabled . I'm not going to explain how to set up HA as you can find many resources on Fortinet websites: https://cookbook.fortinet.com/high-availability-two-fortigates-56/ https://cookbook.fortinet.com/high-availability-with-fgcp-56/ Let's recap what is the main difference between them. The default HA setting is 'override' disabled and this is an order of selection an active unit: 1) number of monitored interfaces - when both units have the same number of working (up) interfaces check next parameter 2) HA uptime - an ...

FortiGate and GRE tunnel

Recently I worked on one project where a client requested to re-route web traffic to the GRE tunnel to perform traffic inspection. I would like to share with you what is required if you configure it on FortiGate. We need a new GRE interface and policy base routing (PBR) to change the route for specific source IPs. Of course you need firewall policies to permit the traffic. Let's start with GRE interface. Unfortunately you can't configure it using the GUI, only CLI is the option: config system gre-tunnel edit "gre1" set interface "port1" set local-gw 55.55.55.55 set remote-gw 44.44.44.44 next end When the end peer is Cisco router, you need to set the IP for the GRE interface: config system interface edit gre1 set ip 192.168.10.10 255.255.255.255 set remote-ip192.168.10.20 end In next step we need to fix routing. We need the alternate path via GRE but to keep the route in the active routing table you need to set the same AD (adminis...

IKEv1 aggresive mode

I know that IKEv2 is getting popular but still IKEv1 has a huge presence in production networks. There are many reasons but I’m not going to focus on them. I would rather focus on one issue I see from time to time: ikev1 and an aggressive mode. Just to remind you, there are two modes of ikev1: aggressive and main. The first one is much faster, only three messages are exchanged, but it isn’t secure as the main mode (with six messages). The main problem with the aggressive mode is the first two messages  contain data which may help to perform attack on your VPN. For this test I set up VPN on ASA with ‘aggressive mode’ enabled: ciscoasa# sh run crypto crypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set TS esp-3des esp-md5-hmac crypto map MAPA 10 match address ACL crypto map MAPA 10 set peer 192.168.111.128 crypto map MAPA 10 set ikev1 transform-set TS crypto map MAPA interface inside crypto ikev1 enable inside crypto ikev1 policy 10  authentication pre-share  encryption 3des  hash md5...